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9.1  Introduction 
The basic human  services-health  care, education, day care, and old-age 
care-are  characterized by a strikingly diverse range of organizational forms. 
All of these industries are populated with substantial numbers of firms exhib- 
iting each of three fundamentally different ownership types: for-profit, private 
nonprofit,  and public  (i.e., government-owned).  The market  shares of  these 
ownership types differ markedly  from one service to another,  however,  as 
shown in table 9.1. Moreover, those market shares have been shifting in recent 
decades, and they have been shifting at very different rates in the various ser- 
vices  and  sometimes even in  different  directions.  For example, the market 
share of for-profit firms has been growing rapidly in child care and at a modest 
rate in hospital care, but has apparently been constant or declining in primary 
and secondary education. The market  share of public  firms, meanwhile, has 
been declining steadily in hospital care, remaining  quite constant in primary 
and secondary education, and growing rapidly in higher education. 
Finally, there is also substantial diversity and change within each of the basic 
ownership types. In  particular,  there has  been  a  clear tendency  toward  in- 
creased vertical and horizontal integration among both for-profit and nonprofit 
firms in all of the human services, and at the same time at least an incipient 
tendency toward disintegration among public firms. 
I shall analyze here some of the important  factors that have given rise to 
these ownership patterns,  and  I  shall explore as well  some of the ways that 
public policy can and should affect these patterns in the future. I shall begin 
with some general observations about the role and behavior of firms in each of 
the basic ownership types, and then proceed  to discuss, in turn, each of the 
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Table 9.1  Distribution of Ownership Forms in the Human Services 
(percentages) 




24  64  12 




Nursing homes‘  8  23  69 
Day care center9  7  56  37 
Primary and secondary schoolsc  89  10  I 
Postsecondary institutions(  78  20  2 
?Short-term beds as of  1992 (American Hospital Association  1993-94). 
hNumber  of enrollees as of  1993 (Gray and Schlesinger 1994, 15). 
‘Number of residents as of  1985 (National Center for Health Statistics 1989). 
“Number of spaces as of  1990. Percentage public is based only on programs sponsored by public 
schools, and may  underestimate the total (Kisker et al. 1991, vol. I). 
‘Enrollment as of  1990 (US.  Bureau of the Census, 1993, table 221). See discussion  in text con- 
cerning percentage for-profit. 
‘Enrollment as of  1990 (National Center for Education  Statistics 1992). See discussion in text 
concerning percentage for-protit. 
four principal  human  service industries.  Because the organization  of health 
care has received so much attention recently, I shall try to provide some bal- 
ance by giving special emphasis to education. 
9.2  Nonprofit Firms 
One of the most singular facts about the organization of production  in the 
human services is the large number of private nonprofit firms that these indus- 
tries contain. 
9.2.1  The Affirmative Efficiency Role of Nonprofits 
The defining characteristic of a nonprofit firm is that it is subject to a “non- 
distribution  constraint”  that prohibits  the firm from distributing  its residual 
earnings to any individuals-such  as members, directors, or officers-that  ex- 
ercise control over the firm. There is general scholarly consensus that the most 
convincing efficiency rationale for employing the nonprofit form, as well as 
the apparent reason why nonprofit firms in fact originally arose in most indus- 
tries in which they are found, is that the nonprofit form serves as a crude but 
effective consumer protection device in severe situations of asymmetric infor- 
mation (Hansmann 1987a). More particularly, nonprofits restrain producer op- 
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service is purchased  or consumed or to the nature of the  service itself, are 
unable to evaluate accurately the quantity or quality of the service that a firm 
produces for them. The advantage of a nonprofit firm in such situations is that, 
by virtue of the nondistribution constraint, the managers of the firm are limited 
in their ability to benefit personally  from providing consumers with fewer or 
lower-quality services than promised, and thus have less incentive to do so. 
As a normative justification and positive explanation for the role of nonprofit 
firms, this asymmetric information theory is most obviously convincing when 
the services involved are either being purchased for third parties or are public 
goods, as is the case with most donatively supported philanthropies. When a 
person makes what we call a “donation” or “contribution” to a charity such as 
the Salvation Army or Oxfam, for example, they are in effect purchasing ser- 
vices from the organization that are to be delivered to a third party. The pur- 
chaser, however, has virtually no way of checking whether her payment was in 
fact used to provide services for the intended beneficiaries, much less how well 
or in what quantity those services were performed.  Similarly, when a person 
makes a contribution to an organization such as the American Heart Associa- 
tion (which supports medical research), or to Friends of the Earth (which pro- 
motes environmental protection), or to a listener-supported radio or television 
station, they are in effect purchasing public goods for consumption by  them- 
selves and others. Yet the contributor has no way of determining whether his 
payment actually went to purchase an additional increment of the public good, 
or whether, conversely, the organization would have produced the same quan- 
tity even in the absence of his contribution. In these circumstances, the nondis- 
tribution constraint provides reasonable  assurance that all or nearly all of the 
organization’s receipts will be used to finance production of additional services 
of the type that the organization promises to provide. Consequently, donatively 
supported organizations are almost universally formed as nonprofit firms. 
Many nonprofit firms, however, receive no meaningful amount of income in 
the form of donations, but rather are “commercial nonprofits” whose income 
derives almost exclusively  from fees charged for private  goods and services 
rendered directly to the payor, just as it does for a typical for-profit firm. It is 
sometimes argued that problems of asymmetric information both explain and 
justify the existence  of commercial nonprofits just as they do donative non- 
profits. Today nonprofit hospitals, for example, typically receive no meaningful 
amount of donative income. Yet, because consumers are frequently in a poor 
position to judge the quality of the services that a hospital renders to them, it 
has been suggested that the nonprofit form is appropriate or even necessary to 
protect patients from the type of opportunistic behavior that could be expected 
from a hospital organized as a proprietary firm. This assertion remains contro- 
versial, however,  since both  logic and the available evidence give reason to 
believe that, at least in industries such as the human services, commercial non- 
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firms that provide similar services at similar prices.’ The nondistribution con- 
straint is, after all, a rather blunt instrument for consumer protection. More- 
over, there are a variety of other devices, both public (such as regulation) and 
private (such as reputation), that can be deployed to provide quality assurance 
to customers of for-profit firms who would otherwise be vulnerable to exploita- 
tion owing to asymmetric information.2 
If commercial nonprofits do not provide significantly higher quality services 
than their for-profit competitors, then what accounts for their presence in such 
large numbers? One possibility is that they simply represent institutional  lag: 
they were originally formed as donative nonprofits, and then remained in place 
as the industry’s reliance on donative financing declined. Another possibility is 
that they are a response to public regulation or to public subsidies (such as tax 
exemption or access to tax-exempt bond financing) that have favored nonprofit 
firms, including commercial nonprofits, over their non-profit competitors. 
In  making  public  policy  for the human  services,  it  is important  to  know 
which of these contrasting views of commercial nonprofits is correct, since the 
nonprofit firms in the human service industries are frequently, and increasingly, 
of a commercial rather than a donative character. We shall review some of  the 
evidence below when we examine the individual service industries. 
9.2.2  Potential Inefficiencies 
If nonprofit firms only offered potential efficiency advantages over for-profit 
firms, and no disadvantages, then there would be no reason for concern when 
they occupy a large market share in any given industry. There are, however, 
some potentially  significant inefficiencies that may accompany the nonprofit 
form. 
Operuting Inejjiciency 
It is frequently argued that, since the managers  of nonprofit  firms cannot 
appropriate their firms’ net earnings, they have less incentive to minimize costs 
than do the managers of proprietary firms. The resulting operating inefficiency 
may be outweighed by  the countervailing efficiency advantages of nonprofits 
where there are severe problems of asymmetric information, as is presumably 
the case with donatively supported organizations.  Where consumers are rea- 
sonably capable of policing producer behavior, however, as they may be when 
patronizing commercial nonprofits providing human services-this  incentive 
problem will render nonprofits less efficient than for-profit firms. 
I. Some of the empirical evidence is cited below. See, in addition to those sources, Gray (1986, 
surveying the literature on  health care) and Clarke and Estes (1992, comparing nonprofit  and 
proprietary home health care organizations). 
2. This is not to say that commercial  nonprofits can  never serve as an effective response to 
problems of asymmetric information. A clear example-though  perhaps the only clear example- 
of  an industry  in  which commercial  nonprofits  have arisen  to serve this function is consumer 
savings banking in the early nineteenth century. (See Hansmann in press, chap.  14.) 249  Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in Human Services 
On the other hand, it is not obvious that we should generally expect non- 
profits to be significantly less effective at cost minimization than are for-profit 
firms, particularly  in  industries  such as the human services where, owing to 
low economies of scale, markets are frequently served by a number of compet- 
ing firms. For-profit firms, like nonprofit firms, are often managed by individu- 
als who have no claim to an appreciative share of the firm’s net earnings, but 
rather serve as fiduciaries for the nominal owners,  just as the managers of non- 
profits serve as fiduciaries for the firm’s customers. Moreover, the managers of 
nonprofit  firms have a strong stake in their jobs and their salaries, and may 
derive  substantial  nonpecuniary returns  from the  success of  their organiza- 
tions, all of which give the managers an incentive to promote their organiza- 
tions’  survival, prosperity,  and growth, which  in  turn call for cost minimi- 
zation. Perhaps for these reasons, the available empirical evidence has failed to 
demonstrate clearly that commercial nonprofit firms in the human services are 
generally inferior to for-profit firms in cost minimization  (Pauly  1987; Schle- 
singer  1994). There is therefore reason to believe that concerns about the op- 
erating inefficiency imposed upon the human services through their heavy reli- 
ance on nonprofit firms, while not entirely misplaced, are easily exaggerated. 
Supply Response 
A  more  serious inefficiency  associated  with  nonprofit  firms,  arguably,  is 
their  sluggishness  in expanding  or contracting  their  services in response  to 
changes in demand. 
The empirical evidence indicates fairly clearly that, when demand increases 
rapidly in the human services, nonprofit firms respond by entering or increas- 
ing their capacity only slowly; for-profit firms are much quicker in entering or 
expanding to fill the gap (Steinwald and Neuhauser  1970; Hansmann 1987b). 
Lack of access to equity capital is probably one reason for this slow supply 
response;  lack of incentives for entrepreneurs who create and manage non- 
profits may be another. 
Similarly, nonprofit  firms appear to be  slow to reduce  their output, or to 
withdraw from an industry entirely, when demand for their services contracts. 
Rather, they continue producing even when their invested capital is producing 
a very low or negative return. One reason for this may be that legal constraints 
make it difficult (though not impossible) for a nonprofit  firm to withdraw its 
invested capital from the purposes to which it is currently dedicated (say, provi- 
sion of hospital care in  a prosperous  suburban community) and devote it to 
another purpose  (say, child care for the indigent  in the inner city). Another 
and perhaps more important reason is that nonprofit administrators have little 
incentive to downscale their firms. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that, even in the absence of explicit 
or implicit subsidies, a nonprofit firm can maintain its capacity and even grow 
in circumstances in which a for-profit firm would not be earning a market rate 
of return on its capital. Or at least this is the case for nonprofits-such  as those 250  Henry Hansmann 
typically found in the human service industries-that  have accumulated, either 
from donations or from retained earnings, some significant amount of net capi- 
tal. For a nonprofit firm need not-indeed,  cannot-pay  out a market rate of 
return on its accumulated capital. Consequently, so long as a nonprofit is earn- 
ing just a zero net rate of return on net capital (after depreciation), it can con- 
tinue operating at its current scale indefinitely. And if it earns any positive rate 
of return, even if that rate is well below the opportunity cost of the capital, the 
firm will have retained earnings that it can reinvest in expansion of its capacity, 
or that it can use to subsidize consumption  of services provided with its ex- 
isting capacity. 
Imagine, for example, that a given community  is served by  two hospitals, 
one investor-owned and one nonprofit. Neither hospital provides any research, 
education, free care for the indigent, or other public goods; rather, they both 
just sell private medical  services to individuals capable of paying for them. 
Each hospital has $100 million in net assets, in the form of physical plant and 
equipment that could be sold on the market  for that amount. The nonprofit 
hospital, let us suppose, benefits from no explicit or implicit subsidies, private 
or public. Rather, like the investor-owned hospital,  the nonprofit  hospital is 
subject to aggregate federal and state corporate income taxes of 50% on net 
earnings. The for-profit hospital has annual net earnings of $15 million, repre- 
senting a  15% gross rate of return  on its invested capital, which yields $7.5 
million  dollars, or 7.5%, after taxes. This rate of return  is just equal to the 
market rate of return for similar investments, leaving the firm with no incentive 
to either expand or contract its investment. The nonprofit hospital is substan- 
tidy less cost efficient, with annual net earnings of just $6 million, or 6% of 
net assets, yielding  $3 million,  or 3%, after taxes. If the nonprofit  hospital 
were, instead, an investor-owned institution, this below-market rate of return 
would presumably induce the firm-if  it could not otherwise improve its per- 
formance-to  sell  its plant  and equipment to  another firm that could make 
them yield a gross return of at least  15%, either in providing hospital services 
or in some other activity. But the nonprofit hospital is under little pressure to 
do this. Rather, its managers are free to, and have some incentive to, invest the 
hospital’s net earnings in further plant and equipment. Thus the nonprofit hos- 
pital is in a position to expand by up to 3% per year, taking market share from 
its investor-owned competitor and ultimately,  if it chooses, driving the latter 
out of business entirely, even though the nonprofit firm is clearly the less effi- 
cient producer (and even though it benefits from no publicly provided fiscal or 
regulatory advantages). 
This is not to say that nonprofit firms, no matter how inefficient, will always 
expand their services so long as they are not actually losing money. A nonprofit 
may decide to use its net earnings, not to purchase inefficiently large capacity 
for the provision of private goods, but rather to provide undersupplied public 
goods such as research or free care for the poor. And, if the nonprofit is not an 
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dedicate the sale proceeds to the provision of public goods, or donate them to 
another organization  that can do that effectively. But there is good reason to 
believe that the managers  of nonprofit  firms, like the  managers  of  investor- 
owned  firms, often have an inclination  toward  empire building. And, while 
investor ownership by no means provides a perfect check on this tendency, the 
nonprofit form provides very little check at all. 
The result is that nonprofit firms can act as traps for capital. Although non- 
profits may be slow to accumulate capital, the capital they have accumulated 
tends to become embedded.’ 
In service sectors that are populated by  both nonprofit and for-profit firms, 
and that present no artificial barriers to entry by  for-profit firms, the inability 
of nonprofits to respond quickly to increases in demand need not be a serious 
problem: entry or expansion by  for-profit firms can fill the supply gap. When 
demand for an industry’s services is declining, however, or when demand shifts 
to types of services significantly  different than the existing institutions have 
been providing, for-profit firms may  be an inadequate buffer for the slow re- 
sponse of  the already-existing  nonprofits:  once all the for-profit  firms have 
exited in a given service area, the nonprofit firms may still remain. 
In sum, although nonprofit firms may often manage their existing capacity 
at costs that are not conspicuously higher than those that a for-profit firm would 
incur in like circumstances, nonprofit firms appear to be much more prone than 
for-profit firms to operate with either too little or too much capacity, or capacity 
of the wrong kind. 
9.3  Public Firms 
Although debate about the respective roles of public and private enterprise 
has been a central issue in political economy for the past  150 years, and al- 
though privatization is at the top of the economic agenda throughout the world 
today, there is remarkably little consensus on either normative justifications for 
governmental  ownership or on positive explanations  of why, in fact, public 
enterprise has come to play a large role in some industries-such  as the human 
services-and  not  in  others.  Those gaps  cannot be  adequately  filled  here. 
Rather, we can only point to some considerations that appear particularly im- 
portant in the human services. 
9.3.1  Subsidization 
There are a number of potential justifications for governmental sudsidies to 
private consumption of particular goods and services.  For example, there may 
3. The excess capital that a nonprofit accumulates is sometimes not invested in the firm’s own 
productive  assets, but  is instead held in the form of  financial reserves. The large endowments 
accumulated  by  well-established  private  universities are an  example  (Hansmann 1990). Since 
these reserves are invested in the debt and equity of other firms, they need not result in substan- 
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be positive  externalities  associated  with  private  consumption, or the private 
risk involved in consumption may be lower than the social risk, or capital mar- 
ket imperfections may threaten underconsumption by consumers who are not 
highly liquid, or paternalistic concerns may cause redistribution to the poor to 
be limited to specific goods and services. 
Whether the government subsidizes a given service for these or other mo- 
tives, one way to provide the subsidy is to produce the service directly, through 
government-owned and -operated firms, either without charge or at prices that 
are below cost. In the past, simple subsidization of  this sort has apparently 
often been  the motivation for governmental ownership of enterprise.  Public 
hospitals, which in the United States have frequently been designed to treat the 
indigent, are an example. 
But public subsidies need not necessarily be confined to public firms. One 
alternative is to channel the subsidies to private nonprofit firms, where the non- 
distribution  constraint  serves to assure the government that the value of the 
subsidies will ultimately be passed through to consumers of the firm’s services. 
In the three decades following World War,  11, for example, the federal govern- 
ment provided extensive capital  subsidies directly  to nonprofit hospitals and 
universities.  Why would governmental ownership ever be superior to a system 
of nonprofit firms supported by public subsidies? Better supply response is one 
apparent reason. If government wants to expand supply of a service rapidly, it 
may be easier to create or expand a system of governmental firms than to seek 
to encourage expansion of the nonprofit sector, as I shall discuss further when 
I focus on higher education.  Similarly, it appears easier to induce conrrucrion 
of a sector when the firms are publicly owned than when they are private non- 
profits, as I shall discuss further in connection with hospitals. 
Another alternative to governmental ownership is to structure public subsid- 
ies as demand-side subsidies that consumers can use to purchase services from 
private firms that are either nonprofit or for-profit. In fact, over recent decades, 
one of the most distinctive changes in the production of human services in the 
United States has been a strong tendency for government to move from supply- 
side to demand-side subsidies.  A need for public subsidies therefore translates 
into a justification for public ownership only when there is some reason that 
the subsidies cannot or should not be structured as demand-side subsidies. 
One such reason may be that the transaction costs of administering public 
subsidies are high. Decreases in those transaction  costs over recent decades, 
as systems of public  administration  have become sophisticated, may be one 
important reason for the current trend toward privatization. 
9.3.2  Information Asymmetry 
Whether or not there is a justification  for public  subsidies, governmental 
enterprise can serve the function commonly ascribed to nonprofit firms: to pro- 
tect  consumers from opportunistic  supplier  behavior in  situations  of  severe 
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enterprise over nonprofit firms in this role? Better supply response is again the 
most apparent answer. 
9.3.3  Equality of Consumption 
Another reason to favor governmental enterprise over private firms, whether 
for-profit  or nonprofit, is to encourage or enforce equality of consumption. 
With private-sector firms as suppliers, it is difficult to prevent individuals from 
choosing very different quantities or qualities of consumption. Also, it is diffi- 
cult to prevent consumers from segregating themselves among different sup- 
plying firms according to various socioeconomic or personal  characteristics. 
Where, for some reason, such self-sorting of consumers appears particularly 
undesirable, governmental enterprise has the advantage that it can be organized 
to avoid sorting-or  at least this is the case if, through subsidies or other legis- 
lative preferences,  public firms achieve a near monopoly. As I  shall discuss 
below, this rationale for socialization  is particularly  strong for “associative” 
goods and services, such as education. 
9.4  For-Profit Firms 
The essential efficiency virtues and vices of for-profit enterprise are familiar. 
It is helpful to keep in mind, however, that there are various tactics available 
to for-profit firms to cope with the problems of asymmetric information  that 
would otherwise lead consumers to prefer to patronize  nonprofit or govern- 
mental firms. The most obvious is to offer a reputational  hostage. Horizontal 
integration, which offers the reputation of all units in the system as assurance 
for the performance of each of the individual units, is one method. Franchising 
offers a similar reputational hostage while retaining strong incentives for cost 
minimization at the level of the individual service unit. Not surprisingly, both 
of these approaches have become common among proprietary firms in the hu- 
man services in recent years.4 
9.5  Health Care 
There are three principal types of institutions that market health care to con- 
sumers: primary care providers, such as health maintenance organizations and 
4.  Consumer cooperatives are another ownership form that is sometimes successfully used to 
deal with problems of  asymmetric  information between consumers and producers. The form is 
sometimes found in the human services. Group Health of  Puget Sound, for example, is a well- 
established health maintenance organization organized as a consumer cooperative, and there are 
apparently  also a number of  day care centers organized as consumer cooperatives. Aside from 
these examples, however, consumer cooperatives have made few inroads in the human services. 
An  important reason for this, probably, is that governance costs (including both  the transaction 
costs of decision making and the costs of inefficient decisions) are relatively high in cooperatives 
that provide goods or services as complex as those in the human services that concern us here. In 
general, consumer cooperatives achieve substantial success only in supplying relatively simple, 
homogeneous goods and services (Hansmann  1988, in press). 254  Henry Hansmann 
primary care physicians in solo practice or partnerships; hospitals; and insur- 
ers. It is convenient to begin with hospitals, which have been the subject of the 
most intense study in the literature on ownership. 
9.5.1  Hospitals 
Until late in the nineteenth century, hospitals were almost exclusively chari- 
table institutions-in  essence, sick houses for the poor, supported heavily by 
philanthropic contributions. It was therefore natural that nongovernmental hos- 
pitals were organized as nonprofit firms, in order to cope with the problems of 
asymmetric information facing their donors. 
Over the past century, however, advances in medical technology have trans- 
formed hospitals into places  where persons of means also go for treatment. 
Moreover, with the development during the twentieth century of first private 
and then  public  health  insurance,  the overwhelming  majority  of Americans 
have become capable of paying for the hospital services they consume. As a 
consequence, charitable donations no longer represent a significant source of 
income for most short-term  acute-care hospitals; rather, nonprofit as well as 
investor-owned hospitals now rely almost exclusively on patient fees for their 
income. 
There have been  substantial numbers of for-profit hospitals  in the United 
States throughout the twentieth century. Until twenty-five years ago, however, 
these proprietary  hospitals were often small clinics owned by  the doctors to 
whose practices they were connected (Steinwald and Neuhauser 1970). With 
the implementation  of Medicare and Medicaid in  1966, the average hospital 
became a profitable enterprise, more than able to cover its costs with patient 
fees. As a consequence, large publicly held business corporations began enter- 
ing the industry, creating substantial chains of hospitals by acquisition and con- 
struction. After twenty-five  years of aggressive efforts at expansion by  these 
proprietary  chains, the market share of for-profit hospitals has expanded no- 
ticeably, though not spectacularly, from 6% of all short-term beds in  1971 to 
12% in  1992. Nevertheless,  nonprofit  hospitals  continue to account for the 
great majority of all beds. In fact, the market share of nonprofit hospitals has 
actually increased slightly over this period, from 63% in 1965 to 64% in 1992 
(American Hospital Association  197  1,  1993-94).5 In terms of overall market 
share, the growth of the large for-profit hospital chains has come at the expense 
of smaller proprietary hospitals and of government hospitals. 
Given the transformation of the hospital industry from a charitable to a fee- 
for-service basis,  why  do nonprofits  continue to have  such a  large  market 
share? There appear to be two potential rationales that are attractive in terms 
of social welfare. The first is that the nonprofit form protects consumers against 
5.  Prior to 1971, counts of short-term beds in federally owned hospitals are apparently unavail- 
able. Among nonfederal hospitals, however, the market shares of  nonprofit, for-profit, and govern- 
mental hospitals remained constant from 1960 to  1971, at 70%, 6%, and 24%,  respectively. 255  Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in Human Services 
opportunistic exploitation of informational advantages. Empirical scrutiny has 
failed, however, to produce clear evidence that the quality of care in nonprofit 
hospitals is, on average, higher than that in proprietary hospitals (Gray 1986). 
This is not surprising. It is not obvious that problems of asymmetric informa- 
tion are so severe in this sector that the nonprofit form is likely to be a useful 
antidote. Hospitals generally provide relatively simple services, such as room, 
board, medical supplies, and nursing care; it is the doctors that practice in the 
hospitals that provide the most complex services, and those doctors are gener- 
ally independent contractors rather than employees of the hospital. Indeed, the 
doctors serve as sophisticated purchasing agents for their patients in the con- 
sumption of hospital  services. Moreover, the  large for-profit  hospital chains 
have an important reputational stake in providing high-quality service. 
The second  potential justification  for the continuing  survival of nonprofit 
hospitals is that the nonprofit form is needed to assure that the remaining indi- 
rect public subsidies to the hospital sector, such as tax exemption, are actually 
utilized to finance the public goods for which they are intended, such as re- 
search, education, and subsidized  care for those members of the population 
who remain uncovered by health insurance. Yet most nonprofit short-term hos- 
pitals undertake no meaningful amount of research or teaching (in particular, 
they generally have no interns or residents), and the available data do not dem- 
onstrate convincingly that nonprofit hospitals on average provide significantly 
more uncompensated care than do proprietary hospitals. 
All of this suggests that the nonprofit  form is largely anachronistic  in the 
hospital industry,  and that if  that industry were to be re-created  today from 
scratch, nonprofit firms would represent a much smaller share of total capacity 
than they do now.  This suggests, in turn, that the continuing large market share 
of the nonprofits is in large part the result of capital embeddedness. 
This holdover of large numbers of nonprofit firms does not necessarily result 
in  serious inefficiency in the hospital  industry. As we noted above, there  is 
reason to believe that the operating efficiency of such commercial nonprofits 
is relatively  high in a competitive  industry  such as hospital  care. Rather,  if 
there is inefficiency, it may well lie more in the maintenance of excessive ca- 
pacity among the nonprofits, and in the use of that capacity to provide exces- 
sive services. 
What problems does this create for public policy? If nonprofit hospitals are 
no longer providing a quantity or quality of service that is unavailable from 
proprietary hospitals, then it is hard to justify continuance of subsidies such as 
tax exemption. And, in fact, the tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals has al- 
ready come under serious assault at both the local and national levels. Removal 
of tax exemption will not itself, however, solve the problem of capital embed- 
dedness. As we noted above, even in the absence of such subsidies, nonprofit 
firms can survive and grow even if the implicit rate of return on their invested 
capital is well below its opportunity cost. 
This suggests that there is reason to seek a method to facilitate the transfer 256  Henry Hansmann 
of invested hospital plant from nonprofit to for-profit firms. Legislation forcing 
conversion of nonprofit hospitals to the for-profit form, even if it were politi- 
cally feasible (which it probably is not), seems an unnecessarily  strong step. 
An alternative is to impose on the managers and directors of nonprofit hospitals 
(and, indeed, of nonprofit corporations  generally) stricter fiduciary duties in 
responding  to purchase offers, similar to the duties that the courts have im- 
posed on the managers of business corporations, over the past decade, in re- 
sponding to takeover bids. Indeed, since the directors of most nonprofit hospi- 
tals are self-appointing,  rather than (as in a business corporation) elected by 
the individuals whom they serve as fiduciaries, there is good reason to impose 
on those directors fiduciary duties that are significantly stricter than those im- 
posed on the directors of business corporations. In particular, one could place 
a substantial burden on the directors of a nonprofit hospital to justify any deci- 
sion not to sell their assests to another firm, nonprofit or for-profit, that makes 
a serious bid  to purchase  them, and  give the bidders  standing to bring suit 
to enforce that duty. (The money that the nonprofit received from such a sale 
of assets would presumably be placed in a fund to be used for charitable pur- 
poses, such as financing  medical  care for indigents  or promoting  medical 
research.) 
We  observed  earlier that an  apparent  advantage  of  public  over  nonprofit 
firms is that public firms can sometimes exhibit faster supply response. The 
hospital industry offers evidence of this. The shift from supply-side to demand- 
side subsidies represented by  Medicare and Medicaid, as we have noted, de- 
prived both  nonprofit  and public  hospitals of their unique  role  in providing 
subsidized services to the poor. Moreover, in the 1980s, hospital usage in the 
United States as a whole began to decline. Presumably as a response to these 
developments, the rate of capacity expansion in both public and nonprofit hos- 
pitals slowed in the 1970s, and by the mid-1980s the aggregate number of beds 
in both types of hospitals actually began to decline. This reduction  and ulti- 
mate reverse of the growth rate was conspicuously more rapid in public than 
in nonprofit hospitals, however, with the result that, while the aggregate market 
share of the nonprofit hospitals remained roughly constant, the market share 
of the public hospitals contracted from 31% of all short-term beds in 1971 to 
24% in 1992 (American Hospital Association  1971, 1993-94). 
Does there remain a potential role for public ownership of hospitals? Cost 
control is the justification most forcefully argued today. Unavoidable imperfec- 
tions  in  the market for health  insurance, the  argument goes, create  strong 
incentives  for excessive  consumption of  health  care, and  these  incentives 
are amplified by public  subsidies. The only way  to avoid overconsumption, 
therefore, is to ration supply, and the easiest way to do this is simply to make 
the government  the owner of  the  hospitals.  Whether the  extensive govern- 
mental  ownership of  hospitals  characteristic  of  other  developed  economies 
has helped control costs in those  countries is, however, a matter of dispute 
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9.5.2  Primary Physician Care 
Prior to the early  1970s, primary  care physicians  were organized  almost 
entirely in proprietary practices owned by the physicians themselves, either as 
sole proprietorships or as partnerships. Investor ownership was effectively ille- 
gal under state legislation sponsored by  the medical profession, as was any 
form of prepaid group practice except for plans operated by  nonprofit firms. 
The federal  Health Maintenance  Organization Act of  1973 swept away this 
restrictive state legislation, and created as well some affirmative incentives for 
the creation of health maintenance organizations. Initially, however, those fed- 
eral incentives favored HMOs incorporated as nonprofits. 
As  a  consequence  of  these  developments,  all  HMOs established  before 
1973, and most HMOs created in the decade following 1973, were nonprofit. 
As HMOs became better established, however, and as the federal legislation 
was modified to be neutral concerning forms of ownership, for-profit HMOs 
gained market share rapidly. As of 198  1, only 12% of all HMO enrollees were 
in for-profit plans; just twelve years later, in 1993, the figure had increased to 
52% (Gray and Schlesinger 1994). 
Unlike nonprofit hospitals, nonprofit HMOs in general have no history of 
donative support, but rather have been purely commercial nonprofits since they 
were founded. The only efficiency rationale that can be offered for the non- 
profit form among these organizations, therefore, is apparently that problems 
of asymmetric information are so severe for the customers of HMOs that for- 
profit HMOs could not be trusted. This argument, a priori, seems more persua- 
sive for HMOs than the similar argument is for hospitals, for several reasons. 
First, HMOs provide  actual physician  services and not, as is often the case 
with hospitals, just ancillary services that are ordered by  a patient’s doctor. 
Second, the financial structure of an HMO, unlike a hospital, gives the organi- 
zation a strong incentive to economize on the care given a patient, since the 
organization itself, and not the patient or the patient’s insurer, bears the full 
cost of the care it administers to its customers. Third, hospitals are more capi- 
tal-intensive  institutions than are HMOs, and consequently  are handicapped 
more severely than HMOs by  being denied access to equity capital, as non- 
profits necessarily are. The fact that for-profit firms have a much larger market 
share among HMOs than among hospitals, therefore, offers further support for 
the conclusion, suggested above, that if  the hospital industry, like the HMO 
industry, were to be created anew today, the ratio of proprietary to nonprofit 
firms would be much higher than it presently is. 
To be sure, the large proportion of for-profit HMOs might be a disequilib- 
rium phenomenon that simply reflects the slow supply response of nonprofits. 
Once the total supply of HMOs has matched demand, so that the rate of new 
entry and expansion is much smaller than it is at present, the market share of 
the nonprofit HMOs may begin rising again. But there is reason to believe that 
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arise-the  six largest chains together now have 25% of all HMOs (Gray and 
Schlesinger  1994)-and  their reputational stake promises reasonable protec- 
tion  against  opportunistic  behavior.  Moreover,  many  of  the  customers  of 
HMOs are not individuals but rather large employers and unions that have con- 
siderable sophistication in purchasing medical care and thus are unlikely  to 
feel that they will obtain important protection from patronizing nonprofit firms. 
On the other hand, the substantial heterogeneity of structure among HMOs, 
and the ambiguity of the categories to which firms are assigned in the available 
data, make it difficult to draw clear conclusions about the recent evolution of 
the industry. Much of the growth in for-profit HMOs has been among indepen- 
dent prxtice associations (IPAs), which now account for 40% of all HMOs. 
But IPAs, unlike the more traditional group and staff model HMOs, maintain 
little direct control over their affiliated physicians, serving principally just as 
insurers rather than as direct providers  of care. Consequently, IPAs arguably 
have less ability to engage in opportunistically excessive cost cutting than do 
pure group and staff model HMOs, which as of  1993 remained 80% nonprofit 
(Interstudy 1994).6 
9.5.3  Insurance 
Health insurance in the United States first became important with the advent 
of Blue Cross hospital insurance in the late 1920s. Blue Cross was originally 
established by  nonprofit hospitals as a means of increasing the ability of pa- 
tients to pay their hospital bills. Since the hospitals were themselves nonprofit 
and were more interested in having their own bills paid than in seeking profits 
in the insurance business, and because a nonprofit provider was more likely to 
convince consumers that they could trust this new insurance product, it made 
sense to organize Blue Cross on a nonprofit basis. Subsequently, Blue Shield 
plans  to provide  insurance  for physicians'  services were  organized  on  the 
same model. 
In the following decades, for-profit firms entered the health insurance busi- 
ness and captured a majority  of the market from the Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
plans. This development brought some difficulties, however, since the resulting 
increased competition aggravated the problem of adverse selection by consum- 
ers and selective rating by  insurance companies, recently forcing Blue Cross 
to abandon its traditional policy of broad community rating. 
Elimination of these selection problems, and of the reduction in risk spread- 
ing to which they give rise, may  have been one reason why the government 
itself stepped in as the insurer when, in 1965, the national government decided 
to subsidize health insurance for the elderly and the poor through the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs. (Administrative simplicity was perhaps another justi- 
fication for socialization.) The selection problem remains a central issue now, 
6. A  particular difficulty  is that  the  Interstudy data, which  appear the best  available,  assign 
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as the nation debates the appropriate scope of direct governmental involvement 
in extending coverage to the remaining groups of uninsured Americans. Com- 
plete  socialization  in the form of  universal  federal health  insurance,  would 
greatly mitigate the problems involved in creating appropriately  large insur- 
ance pools, potentially  allowing health  risks to be spread as broadly  as the 
society chooses (although the nature of the political process might limit sub- 
stantially the types of pooling that could realistically  be chosen). But, to be 
effective, governmental health insurance would presumably have to place sub- 
stantial limits on consumer choice concerning the types of coverage, and hence 
treatment, to obtain. The mandatory government-managed  regional insurance 
pools featured in current health care reform proposals are an effort at an inter- 
mediate solution. 
9.6  Nursing Care 
As of  197 1, nonprofit nursing homes accounted for only 18% of all nursing 
care, with most of the rest provided by  for-profit homes. Fifteen years later, in 
1985, the size of the nursing care industry had nearly doubled.  Nevertheless, 
nonprofit  nursing  homes not  only retained  but  even expanded their market 
share over that period, from 18% to 23% (National Center for Health Statistics 
1974, 1989). This expanding market share in the context of a growing industry 
provides some evidence that, for at least a substantial minority of consumers, 
nonprofit firms are perceived as providing a meaningful  degree of protection 
against opportunistic producers. In part, however, it may also be a consequence 
of indirect subsidies and of favoritism toward the nonprofit form among state 
licensing and regulatory authorities. 
The nursing care industry provides evidence of a problem presented by non- 
profit firms that is, in a sense, simply an exaggeration of their virtue: they have 
a distinct bias in favor of high-quality service. Nonprofit nursing homes serve 
disproportionately the high-quality high-cost end of the market (McKay 199  1 ). 
This is presumably  because nonprofit homes tend to serve the nonpecuniary 
goals of  the professionals who manage them, seeking to provide the highest- 
quality service possible and choosing to provide no care at all rather than care 
of low quality-and  hence failing to serve the large segment of the market that 
can afford to pay only for minimal care. 
9.7  Day Care 
It would seem that problems of asymmetric information are less serious in 
day care than in nursing care, since families presumably are much more willing 
and able to monitor closely the quality of care that is provided to their children 
than that which is provided to their parents. Consequently, one might expect 
that nonprofit firms would play a smaller role in day care than in nursing care. 
It is therefore interesting that the reverse is the case: as table 9.1 shows, non- 260  Henry Hansmann 
profit firms have more than twice the market share in day care that they do in 
nursing care. 
The interpretation of the market-share data for day care centers is clouded, 
however, by  the fact that the distinction between the nonprofit and for-profit 
organizational  forms is much  less clear in the case of the very  small-scale, 
labor-intensive firms such as individual day care centers than it is in larger- 
scale  and  more  capital-intensive  enterprise.  The nondistribution  constraint 
ceases to have much bite when most of a firm’s income goes to salaries, and in 
particular when a substantial fraction of that income goes to the wages of the 
persons who control the firm: the salaries paid by a small, nominally nonprofit 
firm, and particularly the salaries of the administrators, can simply be adjusted 
at intervals to absorb the bulk of the firm’s income as that income rises and 
falls. Consequently, many small day care centers may have adopted the non- 
profit rather than the for-profit form simply because the choice would have 
little effect on the way in which the center was operated, but might bring some 
benefits in attracting consumers, in taxation,  and in regulation. When a firm 
operates a substantial chain of day care centers, in contrast, the nondistribution 
constraint imposes important limits both on the ability of managers to appro- 
priate a substantial fraction of potential net revenues and on the ability of the 
firm to obtain additional capital. This may help explain why the larger child 
care organizations  tend  strongly  to  be for-profit. As of  1992, for example, 
seven of the eight day care firms that had a total capacity of more than 5,000 
children were for-profit. The tendency toward larger size among the for-profit 
firms may also, of course, reflect  an effort to use the system’s reputation as 
assurance of  quality.  In any  case, the  largest for-profit  firms are now  quite 
large. The biggest  of  them, KinderCare, operated over  1,200 centers  as of 
1992, with a total capacity of  145,000 children (Neugebauer 1992; Stephens 
and Neugebauer 1992). 
Although there has been much controversy over the expanding role of for- 
profit day care centers, to date neither quantitative nor qualitative surveys sug- 
gest that, on average, the for-profit centers provide a lower quality of care than 
do nonprofit centers with the same level of income per child (Kagan 1991). 
(As with nursing homes, nonprofit day care centers on average provide more 
expensive care than do for-profit centers, and for this reason on average provide 
higher quality care [Neugebauer 1992, table 21.) 
There is reason to doubt, then, that nonprofit day care centers serve an im- 
portant role in providing parents with reassurance about quality care. On the 
other hand, they may serve an important role in capitalizing on the willingness 
of parents and organizations to donate materials, space, and (most importantly) 
labor to day care. The value of these donations is substantial, and, although 
some of them go to for-profit centers, for reasons rehearsed in section 9.2 the 
nonprofit  centers  naturally  attract  most  of  the  donative  support  (Coelen, 
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Publicly owned and operated day care centers, as table 9.1 shows, constitute 
only about 7% of the total. This figure contrasts strongly with the large role of 
public enterprise in primary and secondary education. An even more striking 
contrast between day care and grade school is evident in the way that public 
funding, and particularly federal funding, influences patterns of consumption. 
The politically  and  academically  popular  national  Head  Start program  cur- 
rently pays for 6% of all children in day care (Kisker et al. 1991, table 3.5). 
The Head Start program itself does not own or operate day care centers; rather, 
it provides subsidies to private nonprofit centers that meet the program’s quali- 
fications (and sometimes as well to centers operated by  local governments). 
Among the requirements that a day care center must meet to receive Head Start 
funding is, in effect, that the center serves only children whose care is subsi- 
dized by Head Start-which  is to say, very poor children, and disproportion- 
ately members of minority groups. As a consequence, the Head Start program 
strongly promotes the segregation of preschool children, de jure by class and 
de facto by  race. As  I  shall discuss below, the most consistently  argued and 
perhaps the most persuasive argument for publicly provided primary and sec- 
ondary education  is that public  schools help avoid the severe segregation of 
children by  class, capacity, and previous acculturation that might be expected 
in a system of private schools. Consequently, public policy toward preschool 
children seems to be strongly inconsistent with policy toward children in grade 
school and high school. 
This inconsistency is not an administrative necessity. It appears that no ap- 
preciable  accounting  burden  would be placed  on the Head Start program  if 
day care centers serving Head Start-subsidized  children were to enroll other 
children as well, so long as those other children were entirely paid for by fees 
or other income sources. Why, then, are Head Start children segregated in sepa- 
rate centers? One explanation that has been offered is that, since Head Start 
has never been funded at a level sufficient to provide day care to all children 
who nominally qualify for the program, some form of rationing must be em- 
ployed. And it is relatively easy to deny access to the program on the grounds 
that all spaces at the local Head Start centers are occupied, while it would be 
harder to explain why there are quotas on the number of poor children that the 
government will sponsor to attend centers that also serve more affluent chil- 
dren, even when those centers have space available. Or, put differently, so long 
as Head Start centers are segregated from other day care centers, it is easier 
to maintain the principle that day care, unlike primary and secondary school 
education, is a privilege and not an entitlement. 
Head Start is not, however, entirely typical of public subsidies to day care. 
Many state programs of day care subsidy, both demand-side and supply-side, 
are explicitly structured to encourage centers to enroll children from a range 
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9.8  Primary and Secondary Education 
Primary and secondary education is notable as the human service sector in 
which the role of public institutions is the largest, and the role of for-profit 
firms is the smallest. 
9.8.1  For-Profit Schools 
Nobody seems to know, even approximately, how many for-profit primary 
and secondary schools there are in the United States. Statistics collected at the 
national  level break down primary and secondary schools simply into public 
and private, without distinguishing between private schools that are nonprofit 
and those that are for-profit. Moreover, out of ten states surveyed for this essay 
only one-California-maintains  statistics on the number of  private schools 
that are for-profit. Those data show that currently  1,273 out of 4,005 private 
schools in California, or 32%, are for-profit, and that those for-profit schools 
enroll 58,336 out of 574,243 private school students, or about lo%.’ Given that 
California appears to have larger proportions of proprietary institutions in other 
service sectors than most states, it seems likely that the ratio of for-profit to 
nonprofit schools in the U.S. as a whole is lower than lo%, but at present there 
seems no way of  knowing. The figure of  1% for nationwide proprietary pri- 
mary and secondary school enrollment given in table 9.1 is a guess, based on 
the California data. 
We have even less information on the characteristics and quality of proprie- 
tary schools. From the California figures, the proprietary schools are generally 
small, with only 46 students on average (as compared with an average of  189 
students for the nonprofit private  schools). This is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence  suggesting  that  for-profit  schools  nationwide  are  predominantly 
small academies that are often run as family businesses. 
Unlike the other industries discussed  above-hospitals,  HMOs, insurers, 
nursing homes,  and day care centers-in  primary and  secondary education 
there are no large for-profit  firms that have constructed regional or national 
chains of institutions. Recently, however, two firms have begun to try: Whittle 
Communications and Educational Alternatives, Inc. Neither of these firms has 
had significant success to date, and both are scaling back their ambitions for 
the moment, seeking only to obtain contracts from local governments to ad- 
minister publicly owned  schools rather than,  as they initially planned, con- 
structing or acquiring schools that the companies will own themselves. Pos- 
sibly these companies made their plans in the anticipation that publicly funded 
school voucher plans will be widely implemented by national, state, or local 
government, and that this will create the same type of opportunity for proprie- 
7. Telephone interview with Ron Reid, Demographics Office, California Department of Educa- 
tion, August 4, 1994. The other nine states surveyed were Connecticut, Florida, Illinois. New York, 
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tary schools that Medicare and Medicaid created for proprietary hospitals and 
nursing homes a generation earlier. If so, it now appears that they must be pa- 
tient. 
9.8.2  Nonprofit Schools 
Even  in  California,  nonprofit  schools  strongly  outnumber  proprietary 
schools. It may be that this is a reflection of parents’ concerns about quality- 
the problem of asymmetric information. Parents might well doubt their ability 
to evaluate the education that their child is receiving. On the other hand, it is 
not clear that this should be, or is, an important factor. The content and meth- 
ods of primary and secondary education are not so esoteric  as to be beyond 
many parents’ ability to evaluate. Moreover, schools develop substantial repu- 
tations over time. 
Another reason for the predominance of nonprofit firms may be that which 
I suggested above for day care centers. For small institutions, such as the forty- 
six-student proprietary schools in California, there may be little practical dif- 
ference between operating as a sole proprietorship, partnership, or closely held 
corporation on the one hand, and incorporating as a nonprofit corporation on 
the other; the individuals who manage the school will be able to derive roughly 
the same income from it either way. But the nonprofit form has the benefit of 
tax exemption, a better public image, and probably  easier accreditation.  In- 
deed, there  is anecdotal evidence that  private schools are often founded as 
proprietary firms, and then convert to the nonprofit form once they become es- 
tablished.8 
Another reason for a school to adopt the nonprofit form is to attract private 
donations and public grants. Surely this is a factor among the elite preparatory 
schools, which solicit contributions from their alumni. It is also obviously a 
factor among religiously affiliated schools, which often receive financial sup- 
port from their parent churches. Whether donations and grants are a significant 
source of income for nonprofit schools in general, however, is unclear. It seems 
a reasonable guess that most are, instead, almost purely commercial nonprofits. 
9.8.3  Public Schools 
The market share of public primary and secondary schools has long been 
relatively constant in the United States. It was 91% of enrollment in 1930, fell 
8. Note that this transaction can be accomplished with little sacrifice of control or earnings. The 
individuals who own the proprietary school-whether  through a sole proprietorship, a partnership, 
or a closely held corporation-simply  form a nonprofit corporation, with no assets and with them- 
selves as directors and officers. They then sell the school’s assets to the nonprofit corporation at a 
generous price, providing 100% financing and taking back long-term notes at a substantial rate of 
interest for the purchase price. They continue to control the school and pay themselves salaries for 
the services they render to it, as they did with the proprietary school. And they continue to derive 
a return from the capital they originally invested in the school, through the payments on the notes. 
Prior to the  1960s, this pattern-formation  as a for-profit firm, and then  a controlled sale to a 
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to 86% in  1960, and returned to  89% by  1990 (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 
1970, 1993). 
It is not easy to offer a clear normative justification  for this  large public 
sector. Surely there has been, at least in the past, an efficiency justification 
for public subsidy. Education is presumably a worthwhile investment for most 
children, but  in many families both the children and their parents  (who are 
usually not yet in their peak earning years) may be relatively illiquid and, for 
familiar reasons, unable to borrow to finance the child’s acquisition of human 
capital. Thus, without subsidy, there could be substantial underconsumption. 
And, at least until recently, it has probably  been difficult for governments to 
administer school subsidies on a demand-side rather than a supply-side basis, 
so that governments had to own and operate the schools they financed. This 
argument does not, however, provide a strong justification for public schools 
if, as advocates of voucher plans have been arguing for some years, demand- 
side subsidies are now feasible. 
In any case, there is an increasingly prominent debate today as to whether 
this large public share should continue-a  debate that has been fueled by the 
popular concern with the seemingly low quality of American primary and sec- 
ondary education. Most reform proposals call for putting more competition 
into the system. Comparison of American higher education, which is outstand- 
ing by  world  standards,  with  American  primary  and  secondary  education, 
which is not, offers some support for this judgment, since the most distinctive 
characteristic of the American system of higher education is its highly compet- 
itive character. Empirical comparisons of the quality of differently organized 
schools, and particularly of public and private schools, also tend to support the 
call for more competition. Although  it is difficult  to distinguish  clearly be- 
tween  the effects of  different types of  schools and the consequences of  the 
self-sorting of families among those schools, there is evidence that more auton- 
omous schools,  and particularly private  schools, provide  a better education 
(Chubb and Moe 1990). 
The most conspicuous of  the recent reform advocates, Chubb and Moe, call 
for maintaining public ownership of schools while decentralizing administra- 
tion and giving families freedom to choose the public school they prefer, with 
funding to take the form of a demand-side subsidy. Those authors do not, how- 
ever, explain their reasons for advocating public ownership. All the arguments 
they offer for structural reform  seem strongly to favor private  schools over 
public  schools,  and  arguably  also  favor  for-profit  schools  over  nonprofit 
schools. 
Does there then remain a justification for maintaining schools under public 
ownership? The best  argument,  it appears, and the one that has  been  most 
prominently offered in various forms, is that public schools are justified as a 
means of avoiding excessive stratification of schoolchildren across schools in 
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dren, or gifted children, or white children, it is argued, will tend to congregate 
together in schools, separated from their less privileged contemporaries. 
Why is stratification more of a concern with education than it is with health 
care? Why, that is, do concerns about segregation and stratification not argue 
as well for public ownership of hospitals and primary health care clinics? An 
important answer, evidently, is that stratification is a much stronger phenome- 
non in education because education is, to an unusually pronounced degree, an 
“associative” good-that  is, a good whose utility to a consumer depends, not 
just on the quality of the producer’s performance, but also upon the personal 
characteristics of  the other customers who patronize that same producer (Hans- 
mann and Klevorick 1994; Hansmann 1985). Membership in a country club is 
a prototypical associative good: the attraction of membership in a given club 
depends not just on the quality of the golf course and the food in the club’s 
dining room, but also, and often much more importantly, on the qualities of the 
other members, such as their personalities, skill at golf, socioecenomic status, 
and business contacts. 
Similarly, when attentive parents pick a school for their child, they are inter- 
ested not just in the quality of the classrooms, the curriculum, and the abilities 
of the teachers,  but also, and importantly, in the other students who will be 
attending  the school. The reason, of course, is that a child’s classmates will 
have a strong influence on the education, reputation, motivation, values, and 
bruises that the child acquires from the school. When one chooses a doctor or 
a hospital to perform one’s appendectomy, in contrast, one has little reason to 
put much weight on the personal characteristics of the doctor’s or the hospital’s 
other patients. 
When associative goods are produced by private firms in the market, there 
is a strong incentive for consumers to sort themselves across producers. More 
particularly, to the extent that consumers share similar tastes, there is an incen- 
tive for consumers to become stratified across producing firms, with one pro- 
ducer serving all the individuals  who make the most desirable customers, a 
second producer serving the second most attractive stratum of consumers, and 
so forth. Moreover, although this incentive for stratification exists whether the 
producing firms are for-profit or nonprofit, it is especially strong among non- 
profit firms. Also, stratification is likely to be particularly pronounced if indi- 
viduals’ incomes are positively  correlated  with the characteristics that make 
the individuals particularly attractive as fellow consumers (as generally seems 
true in education), or if  all individuals are constrained to pay the same price 
for the good or service (as they would be under some voucher plans). 
A voucher-supported  system of private schools could thus be expected to 
lead to substantial stratification of students across schools. Public schools are 
arguably less prone to such stratification, since (at least in the absense of free- 
dom-of-choice plans) they generally throw together all children who inhabit a 
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substantial stratification that results from parents’ choice of the school district 
in which to live, and the additional stratification that comes from a system of 
largely private schools might not represent a qualitative change. 
But is stratification such a bad thing? There are several potential arguments 
against it. First, stratification may lead to social inefficiency in education. Less 
talented  students, for example, may  gain  more from attending  school with 
other students who are more talented than the latter would lose from the associ- 
ation. (Perhaps talented students will gain a good education regardless of their 
environment, but less talented students need the challenge and example of tal- 
ented students in order to learn.)  Second, whether or not it is educationally 
efficient,  stratification  may  tend  to reinforce  income  inequality.  And  third, 
whatever the educational and distributional consequences of stratification, it 
may harm noneducational goals such as political integration of the population. 
At present, however, we do not seem to have a very clear idea of  the potential 
seriousness of these concerns. 
9.9  Postsecondary Education 
Postsecondary education, like primary and secondary education, is heavily 
socialized in the United States. What is more, in contrast to primary and sec- 
ondary education, and to the other service industries discussed here as well, 
the market share of public institutions has increased markedly in recent de- 
cades. The fraction of college and university students enrolled in public institu- 
tions was 53% in 1920, and still only 51% in 1950. After the latter date, how- 
ever, the  public  share began  rising  rapidly  and  continuously,  as  shown  in 
table 9.2. 
9.9.1  The Role of Public Institutions 
What accounts for this growth in the public sector? Perhaps the best expla- 
nation is the rapid expansion of the industry. A demographic bulge and rapidly 
increasing prosperity swelled demand for higher education quickly beginning 
in the 1950s. Given the sluggish supply response that characterizes nonprofit 
institutions, it would have been difficult to meet this demand through expan- 
sion of the nonprofit sector, regardless of the generosity of the demand-side 
or supply-side subsidies that government made available. A faster and more 
dependable way to expand supply was simply to have government build and 
operate most of the needed new capacity. Thus, as table 9.2 shows, the five- 
year period that brought the most rapid rate of increase in enrollments, 1960- 
65, also brought the greatest expansion in the public sector-from  57% to 66% 
of all students. 
There has also been substantial expansion in spending on health care in re- 
cent decades, and particularly  in public spending. Yet,  unlike public higher 
education,  the market share of public hospitals did not increase  during this 
period; rather, it declined substantially. What accounts for the difference? A 267  Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in Human Services 
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critical factor, perhaps, is that, despite the expansion in expenditure on health 
care, hospital usage never increased at the same rate as did college enrollment, 
so that there was much less need for rapid creation of new capacity in hospital 
care than in postsecondary  education. The five-year period  in which college 
and university enrollments expanded most rapidly, 1960-65, was also the pe- 
riod in which hospital usage expanded most rapidly. But the growth in average 
daily hospital occupancy over those five years totaled only 18%, while college 
and university enrollments expanded at four times that rate, or 72%, during the 
same period (American Hospital Association  1989). Indeed, the major prob- 
lem during the 1960s and 1970s was not to encourage the construction of more 
hospital capacity, but rather to prevent hospitals from adding new capacity that 
was unneeded, a problem tbat led to the widespread adoption of  hospital cer- 
tificate-of-need regulation by the  state^.^ 
If the major reason to expand the public sector in higher education was to 
meet a sudden bulge in demand, then perhaps it is not necessary to maintain 
that large public sector when demand is no longer increasing quickly. More- 
over, whether we maintain public ownership of the now-extensive state univer- 
sity systems or not, there are strong arguments for converting those systems 
from their current heavy reliance on supply-side subsidies to demand-side sub- 
sidies.  Those  supply-side  subsidies,  as  commentators  have  long  noted 
(McPherson and  Schapiro 199  l), are distributionally  regressive  (since they 
give the same tax-free tuition subsidy to rich students as to poor, and since the 
rich are also more likely to attend the universities). Moreover, the supply-side 
subsidies reduce competition among colleges and universities and limit student 
opportunities by making it much  less expensive for students to attend their 
9. To be sure, there may also have been other important factors that caused the public sector to 
expand in higher education but not in hospital care. One of these, suggested by Victor Fuchs (in 
private communication), is that doctors, who were self-employed independent contractors under 
the prevailing system of private nonprofit hospitals, feared becoming employees in publicly owned 
hospitals, while university professors already had the status of employees and thus had less, or 
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home state’s university  than to  attend  an out-of-state  university or a private 
university in their home state. 
Indeed, while most of the recent debate about expanded voucher programs 
has focused on grade school and high school, there seems to be better reason 
to shift from supply-side to demand-side subsidies, and from public firms to 
private firms, in higher education than in primary and secondary education. 
The market for higher education is effectively national, with thousands of col- 
leges and universities potentially in competition with each other, while markets 
for primary and secondary education outside of major cities are likely to re- 
main local oligopolies. Moreover, prospective college students and their fami- 
lies are probably,  on average, much better informed consumers than  are the 
families that patronize primary and secondary schools. 
This is not to suggest, however, that there is no rationale for public higher 
education outside of the need to expand capacity  rapidly. Like primary and 
secondary education, higher education is an associative good. And, in fact, one 
can see clearly the stratification of students among the elite private colleges, 
which has resulted in a clear and highly stable prestige ranking among those 
institutions.  In  contrast to these  private  colleges,  which  have  generally  re- 
mained relatively small, the state universities commonly operate huge cam- 
puses  that are relatively  unstratified, bringing  together  a broad  spectrum of 
students both academically and socioeconomically. If, as we speculated above, 
stratification has costs in terms of efficiency or equity, then the present public 
university systems may have some virtues worth preserving. 
9.9.2  For-Profit Higher Education 
We are left to ask, finally, why private institutions of higher education have 
been overwhelmingly nonprofit, and whether there might be a larger role for 
for-profit institutions in the future. 
The fact that private colleges and universities have always depended heavily 
on  donative  financing, either in the form of private contributions or public 
grants, is presumably  the principal  reason  why those institutions  have been 
nonprofit. And, why have they had to depend on gifts and grants? The reason 
is apparently much the same that we offered above for public subsidies to pri- 
mary and secondary education. Although  a college education has evidently 
been a worthwhile investment for most students, even in the narrow sense that 
it increased the present value of their lifetime earnings by more than its cost 
(McPherson and Schapiro 199  I), capital market imperfections prevent many 
students from borrowing the amount needed to pay the full cost of  such an 
education. Consequently, there has been a strong need for subsidy. Indeed, the 
pattern of the private college financing that has prevailed for the past century, 
under which the college makes up the gap between costs and tuition revenues 
by  soliciting donations from prosperous alumni, can be thought of as a form 
of implicit loan program under which students pay less than the full cost of 
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tributions to the college to repay generously the risky loan they were in effect 
given (Hansmann 1980). 
If  this is the principal reason that colleges have been nonprofit, however, 
then  a sufficiently  generous  system of public demand-side  subsidies should 
obviate the need for private and public grants, and hence eliminate as well the 
need for the nonprofit form. It is, in fact, hard to find other compelling reasons 
why proprietary colleges and universities  could not succeed. University  stu- 
dents and their families seem sufficiently sophisticated consumers, and institu- 
tional reputations a sufficiently strong signal of quality, that problems of asym- 
metric  information  should  not  be  a  fatal  obstacle.  Nor  need  the  research 
functions served by universities necessarily suffer from organization of higher 
education on a proprietary basis. Most colleges, after all, conduct no significant 
amount of scientific research as it is. And, even for those institutions that find 
there are economies of scope in combining research with teaching, research 
could presumably continue to be financed through the current system of com- 
petitive federal grants even if the receiving universities were proprietary. 
There is already a substantial amount of for-profit postsecondary education 
in  the  United  States,  consisting  of  roughly  four thousand  institutions  that 
largely specialize in vocational  training. Unfortunately,  detailed information 
on these institutions is difficult to find. It appears, however, that many offer 
full-time courses of study of up to two years’ duration, including some amount 
of general education. Moreover, students at these proprietary institutions now 
account for about one-quarter of the grants and one-third of the loans made 
under the federal student aid programs, demonstrating the high responsiveness 
of proprietary institutions to demand-side subsidies (Apling 1993). 
Other countries, moreover, have gone substantially further than the United 
States in developing proprietary higher education. In the Philippines, for ex- 
ample, a majority of college and university students attend proprietary institu- 
tions. This is not a trivial example, since the Philippines not only has the high- 
est rate of higher education among developing countries, but has apparently 
been sending about the same fraction of its youth to college as have Belgium 
and France. Some of the for-profit postsecondary institutions in the Philippines 
are merely trade schools. Several, however, are substantial universities  with 
broad  curricular offerings. And, although the smaller institutions tend to be 
family-owned, the largest have stock that is publicly traded (Geiger 1986). 
One cannot know how successful for-profit firms can be in providing general 
higher education until further experience has been accumulated. But it is hard 
to see a priori reasons why the experiment should fail. 
9.10  Conclusion 
The recent expansion of proprietary firms in the human services forces us 
to ask what role is played by the public and nonprofit  firms that so heavily 
populate those  industries, and whether the latter firms remain  efficient. The 270  Henry Hansmann 
answers to these questions, it appears, differ somewhat from one service indus- 
try to another. In all of these industries, however, it appears that further evolu- 
tion toward proprietary firms is in store. Most importantly, the continuing dom- 
inance  of  education  at  all  levels  by  nonprofit  and,  particularly,  public 
institutions, which sets the sector apart from the other human services, seems 
to lack a strong efficiency rationale. Consequently, education as an industry 
may be on the verge of dramatic changes in the ownership and structure of 
firms much like the changes that have swept health care over the past twenty- 
five years. 
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Comment  Joseph A. Grundfest 
Henry Hansmann’s fine paper makes several significant points about the evolu- 
tion of nonprofit institutions in the human services  sector. Hansmann’s observa- 
tions regarding the presence of “trapped capital” in the nonprofit sector may, 
however, deserve more prominence than he suggests. Billions  of  dollars of 
trapped capital present in the nonprofit sector pose a significant threat to non- 
profit’s efficiency and present a fundamental challenge to the continued vitality 
of the nonprofit sector, particularly in the rapidly changing market for health 
care services. 
Joseph A. Grundfest is professor of law at Stanford Law School and was a commissioner of the 
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Hansmann explains that as long as a nonprofit entity earns a rate of return 
on its capital that is at least equal to real economic depreciation, the nonprofit 
can continue in operation at its current scale indefinitely. There is no pressure 
on the institution to strive for a competitive, risk-adjusted  rate of return that 
recovers the opportunity cost of its capital had that same capital been invested in 
the for-profit sector. Indeed, even if a nonprofit fails to recover its economic de- 
preciation, it can continue in existence for many years longer than an equivalent 
for-profit firm that would be required to earn a positive return on its capital. 
Nonprofit institutions are thereby insulated from market signals that disci- 
pline the private sector and that provide powerful incentives for the efficient 
allocation of capital. In addition, because nonprofits cannot tap private equity 
markets  and  cannot provide  equity-based incentives  for their management 
teams, nonprofit firms typically  do not respond  to market signals as rapidly 
as for-profit  firms.  Hansmann also points  out that nonprofit managers  have 
incentives to preserve the size of their institutions, even if market forces signal 
that downsizing or reallocation of  capital is in the best interests of the social 
purpose that the nonprofit was created to serve. 
As a consequence of these forces, Hansmann explains, nonprofit organiza- 
tions can become pools of “trapped capital.” These trapped capital pools are 
inefficiently managed and are either too large or too small for the purposes 
they are designed to serve. They also cannot be reallocated  to alternate pur- 
poses absent extraordinary events. 
The dangers of trapped capital are obvious. When capital loses its flexibility 
and shifts from “putty” to “clay,” its ability to contribute to economic growth 
is sharply diminished. Alternatively,  viewed from the perspective  of modem 
option theory, capital that cannot be reallocated in response to new information 
has a low “option value” and therefore is not as productive as capital that is 
invested in identical ventures but that can be reallocated in response to subse- 
quently acquired information (Dixit and Pindyck  1994). 
The adverse consequences of trapped capital are most significant at times of 
rapid technological  and demographic change because those are precisely  the 
times at which optionality  is most valuable. Those are also the times when 
the costs imposed by trapped capital are greatest. Now is one of those times, 
particularly in the provision of health care services. 
There are, no doubt, substantial advantages to nonprofit provision of human 
services. Yet,  as Hansmann ably points out, these benefits must be balanced 
against the inefficiencies inherent in the nonprofit sector. This balancing exer- 
cise need not be conducted in the abstract because, despite the prevalence of 
trapped capital in the nonprofit sector, the market can send two distinct types 
of signals about the relative costs and benefits of nonprofit versus for-profit 
organizational forms. The power of these signals may be muted by a variety of 
factors described below,  but  when  market  forces favoring one institutional 
form  over  another  are  sufficiently  strong, the  market’s  message  is  unam- 
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The first signal arises in expanding markets. When a market for human ser- 
vices is growing and when new capital entering the market is disproportion- 
ately of the for-profit form, the market may be sending a signal that the com- 
parative  disadvantage  of the nonprofit form is substantial.  Hansmann’s data 
illustrating  a  shift to for-profit  providers in the health  care field  is  at least 
broadly consistent with this observation (Sacks 1994). 
The second signal is sent by nonprofit organizations  that seek to abandon 
their nonprofit status and transform themselves to for-profit enterprises. This 
signal is far less ambiguous and is a powerful indicator that the monitoring, 
tax, and other benefits associated with the nonprofit form are insufficient to 
overcome the costs imposed by trapped capital, by the lack of access to equity 
market, and by the inability to provide competitive, equity-based incentives 
for employees. 
The power of this signal is compounded by  the fact that a combination of 
federal and state restrictions make such transitions extraordinarily expensive 
and effectively require that the nonprofit enterprise leave all of the equity value 
of  its operations in the nonprofit sector as the price of its conversion to for- 
profit  status. Put another way,  “you can’t take it with you” when it comes to 
shifting capital from nonprofit to for-profit status, and the decision to invest 
capital in the nonprofit form is effectively an irrevocable election of an organi- 
zational form, at least as to the current value of that capital. 
At the federal level, tax law provides that a tax-exempt foundation may ter- 
minate its tax-exempt status either by transferring all of its assets to another 
qualified tax-exempt organization, in which case all of the foundation’s capital 
remains in the nonprofit sector, or by agreeing to pay a termination  tax.’ The 
termination  tax is generally  described as the lesser of  (1) the aggregate tax 
benefit received by the foundation, its substantial contributors, and others with 
interest therein, or (2) the value of the net assets of the foundation. Thus, the 
bargain with the federal government is that a foundation and its major affiliates 
must repay  to the government the value of all benefits received as a conse- 
quence of its tax-exempt status. 
If marginal tax rates are 50% or more, and if all substantial contributors are 
in the top bracket,  then the amount of tax to be paid by  the foundation  will 
equal at least the amount donated by substantial contributors. Thus, unless the 
value of the fund’s assets have increased by an amount greater than the sum of 
the rate of interest charged by the government and the payout rate to benefici- 
aries, there would likely be nothing left to distribute after payment of tax. In- 
deed, it is commonly observed that “the aggregate tax benefit can exceed the 
fair market value of the property transferred, particularly when interest on all 
increases in taxes is added on” (Cesare 1994). 
State law establishes yet another barrier to the free mobility of capital across 
1. For a detailed explanation of the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, see Cesare 
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institutional forms. In California, for example, nonprofit enterprises wishing 
to convert to for-profit status “are required by state law to donate to charity an 
amount equal to their total assets . . .  to repay the benefits the business derived 
while operating as a nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation” (Ellis 1995). A non- 
profit seeking to convert to for-profit status can satisfy this requirement either 
by  establishing  a new  charitable foundation  to which  the value of the con- 
verting enterprise’s assets is transferred, or by donating the value of its assets 
to existing charities. 
The incentives  to convert to for-profit form in some sectors of the health 
care industry are apparently quite powerful. In the past decade, ten to fifteen 
California HMOs have converted to for-profit status, leaving only six nonprofit 
HMOs in the state (Ellis  1995). As part of this trend, Blue Cross, the state’s 
largest health insurer, created a for-profit enterprise, Well Point Health Sys- 
tems, and then sold a 20% equity stake to the public through an initial public 
offering of  common stock. In addition, Blue Cross has proposed converting 
entirely to for-profit  status and is in negotiations with the state corporations 
commissioner over the form of the transaction, which may require a contribu- 
tion  of the remaining 80% stake in Well Point to a new charitable entity as 
well as contributions to existing nonprofit institutions. The value of the Well 
Point equity still to be contributed has been estimated as in excess of $2  billion, 
and the required additional charitable contributions are in excess of $100 mil- 
lion (Ellis 1995; Garrison 1994; “Blue Cross” 1994). 
The benefits  of for-profit  operations  are evidently quite powerful  if  Blue 
Cross is willing to forgo so much capital as the price of a transition to the for- 
profit form. Indeed, this transaction, along with dozens of other conversions 
from nonprofit to for-profit operations, is perhaps the strongest evidence that 
the inefficiencies of the nonprofit form have become quite large-particularly 
in the dynamically changing health care sector. 
This trend toward for-profit operation in a market that already has substan- 
tial nonprofit investment raises significant policy issues. In particular, what, if 
anything can be done to facilitate the efficient flow of capital back from non- 
profit to for-profit  structures? Also, how can nonprofit institutions coexist in 
markets with potentially  more efficient for-profit  competitors?  Ideally, non- 
profit  institutions  will  recognize  their comparative  advantages and  redefine 
their missions so as to capitalize on services that they can perform better than 
for-profit enterprises. Subsidies for the poor, support for certain forms of  re- 
search and public health education, and measuring the quality of services pro- 
vided by the for-profit sector so that informed consumers can promote efficient 
competition are among the services that nonprofits might be able to offer while 
retaining a comparative advantage over their for-profit competitors. The bricks 
and mortar business of actually providing health care coverage may not, how- 
ever, be the best use of the nonprofit dollar. This transformation of the nonprofit 
mission in health care-a  transition looking toward the intricate coexistence of 275  Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit  Enterprise in Human Services 
nonprofit and for-profit form-promises  a series of practical and intellectual 
challenges ripe for further research. 
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